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Abstract
Advances in information technology reduce barriers to information propagation,
but at the same time they also induce the information overload problem. For the
making of various decisions, mere digestion of the relevant information has become a
daunting task due to the massive amount of information available. This information,
such as that generated by evaluation systems developed by various web sites, is
in general useful but may be noisy and may also contain biased entries. In this
study, we establish a framework to systematically tackle the challenging problem of
information decoding in the presence of massive and redundant data. When applied
to a voting system, our method simultaneously ranks the raters and the ratees using
only the evaluation data, consisting of an array of scores each of which represents
the rating of a ratee by a rater. Not only is our appraoch effective in decoding
information, it is also shown to be robust against various hypothetical types of
noise as well as intentional abuses.
Key words: Reputation systems, Information filtering
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1 Introduction and Model
With the rapid advances in information technology, and especially the advent
of the internet, information overload is becoming a growing challenge for our
society. In fact, daily life and professional activities call for reliable information
on a myriad of things, and no individual is capable of knowing it all. We can,
at best, rely on other people’s evaluations to indirectly form an assessment on
a subject or item that happens to catch our interest. Numerous web sites have
already constructed evaluation systems which allow new users to benefit from
the feedback of previous users [1, 2]. However, even though many opinions can
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be found about any single object (be it a book, a product, an idea), they are
frequently far from being consistent with each other, perhaps because people
are of different expertise and/or have different levels of discernment. More
often than not we are left without a clear, definite answer. This situation calls
for automated methods of collaborative information filtering and ranking [4].
Many web sites, which provide information filtering and evaluation for the
general public, are themselves evaluated and ranked by all the individuals
via perhaps other web sites. This self-organized selection has become increas-
ingly popular among internet users and may play an important role in shap-
ing the upcoming information-technology-mediated economics framework. Ex-
amples may be found through web sites such as del.icio.us, www.digg.com,
www.reddit.com, www.tailrank.com et al. In a way, these sites all probe var-
ious selection and filtering mechanisms with varying degrees of success. We
believe that it is time to examine the phenomena systematically in order to
understand the theoretical foundation of information filtering.
In this work we formulate a prototype model to cope with such a challenge.
Suppose N users (raters) rate M objects (ratees) in a given category. Each
user has an idiosyncratic rating capability (1/σi for rater i); each object has
an intrinsic quality (Ql for object l). Both the rating capabilities and intrinsic
qualities are assumed given and hidden. We wish to find estimates, ql and Vi, as
close as possible to the hidden values, Ql and σ
2
i . Absent further information,
people often use the simple arithematical average ql ≡ ∑Ni=1 xil/N as the
estimate for Ql, where xil is the rating assigned by user i to object l. With our
additional assumption that users are of different rating capabilities, we may
regard the rating xil as the sum of Ql and a stochastic component of typical
size σi. Though many users report ratings on a given object, these signals can
be termed noisy since there is no sure way to tell which evaluation is more
reliable than the other. To make sense of these noisy signals our only hope is to
leverage the information redundancy and find the best possible approximation
to the hidden attributes.
As we will show below, the correctness of ranking can be distorted when the
true quality of each object is estimated by the na¨ıve simple average of that
object’s ratings. This effect is amplified especially when the typical σis vary
significantly so that the simple average may be biased by raters with large
σs. Our method, termed iterative refinement, can nevertheless minimize the
occurrence of this undesirable scenario.
2 Method
Our task is to simultaneously obtain good estimates {ql} and {Vi} respectively
for {Ql} and {σ2i } using only the ratings {xil}. Absent knowledge of {σ2i }, the
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simplest solution would be the na¨ıve arithematical average ql =
1
N
∑N
i=1 xil.
Though it conforms to the principle of ‘one person one vote’, such a na¨ıve
average is often said to suffer from the ‘tyranny of the majority’, especially
when the majority is poorly informed. When one knows {σ2i }, one can improve
the accuracy of the prediction by giving more weight to experts with smaller
σis:
ql =
N∑
i=1
wixil, (1)
where wi = w(σi) is a decreasing function of σi and with the normalization
condition
∑
i wi = 1. In fact, if the wi are properly chosen so that Lindeberg’s
condition [9] holds, ql − Ql becomes a zero-mean Gaussian random variable
with variance∝ 1/N whenN →∞, thanks to the Lindeberg-Feller theorem [9,
10]. Further, knowledge of {σ2i } actually allows the determination of optimal
choice [11] for the weight wi ∝ 1/σ2i .
The problem, however, is that we know neither which are the best objects, nor
who are the best raters. Nevertheless, since a better estimate of {σ2i } will im-
prove our estimate of {Ql}, we have devised an iterative refinement method to
simultaneously extract the raters’ rating capabilities and the objects’ intrinsic
qualities. In particular, the rating capability of rater i is estimated by
σ2i ≈ Vi ≡
1
M
M∑
l=1
(xil − ql)2 . (2)
It is worth pointing out that due to error propagation (e.g. estimating Ql by
ql), equation (2) is not the best possible estimator of σ
2
i . Although it is pos-
sible to systematically compute all the correction terms by creating effective
Gaussian variables through recombining random variables, we will not execute
such a technique here to avoid unnecessary complications. The more techni-
cal optimization of the method proposed will be discussed in a forthcoming
publication.
Assuming the weights to be of power-law type
wi =
1/V βi∑
j 1/V
β
j
ql→Ql=⇒ 1/σ
2β
i∑
j 1/σ
2β
j
, (3)
equations (1) and (2) can be cast into a more suggestive form:
N∑
i=1
1
V βi
(xil − ql) = 0, l = 1, 2, . . . ,M ; (4)
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M∑
l=1
(xil − ql)2
Vi
=M, i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (5)
The above construction is intuitively appealing especially when β = 1/2. As-
suming that the ratings fluctuate around the hidden qualities Ql with varying
widths σi, the first equation is the sum of stochastic variables with a unique,
normalized width, and the second sum defines the widths. On the other hand,
the case β = 1 intimately mimics the optimal weighting choice [11].
To solve for the N + M unknowns using as many (nonlinear) equations is
usually achieved by casting the problem as a minimization [12]. This route is,
in general, difficult for a nonlinear system because of the existence of multiple
local minima that hinder the finding of the global one. When the equations
are such that local minima rarely occur, finding the solution becomes a rela-
tively straightforward numerical task. Fortunately, this is where our problem
belongs. Our iterative refinement method starts with uniform weighting, then
iterates eqs. (4,5) till convergence to the final solution with specified {ql ≈ Ql}
and {Vi ≈ σ2i }. Thus, we find simultaneously qualities of the ratees and raters.
As a cautionary note, we must comment that eq. (4) with β = 1/2 takes a
more gentle weight than suggested by the optimal weighting [11], which would
recommend β = 1. We choose a softer weighting scheme to start because it
enjoys a better numerical stability, as well as translational and scale invariance
– the equations remain the same upon changing ql → c[ql − g] and xil →
c[xil − g]. The better numerical stability for β = 1/2 may be due to the
fact that Lindeberg’s condition [9] is always satisfied there. Once the iterative
procedure starts, the weighting scheme is then shifted from 1/σ towards 1/σ2
as the iterations progress. If the Lindeberg’s condition is satisfied for 1/2 <
β ≤ 1, this construction guarantees the convergence of q towards Q when
each individual distribution function for xil is distinct but with a finite second
moment, thanks to the Lindeberg-Feller Theorem [9, 10]. As will be shown,
the correct convergence is obtained even when the requirements leading to the
general form of Law of Large Numbers are not satisfied, making our proposal
far more general than the traditional proven domain.
3 Tests, results, and analysis
Before any rating system can be put into real use, it must at least pass theo-
retical quality control. The goal for a rating system is to produce the best ap-
proximation achievable, and to be robust against abuses and gaming attempts.
Any proposed decoding scheme should undergo testing under controlled con-
ditions (i.e. where {Ql} is known), whereas adaptation of a decoding method
to realistic applications usually requires a leap of faith since {Ql} is unkonwn.
In fact, we would never know what the hidden, intrinsic attributes are or their
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underlying distribution. A decoding method has a higher chance of success in
the real world if it can consistently find the approximate hidden attributes
with a high precision under a wide variety of controlled conditions. We try to
choose, among infinite possibilities, a number of case-studies we deem most
significant.
We assume the intrinsic qualities (Ql for object l) to be uniformly distributed
and the ratings xil to be drawn from various individual distribution functions
PV (xil), centered around Ql and characterized by different widths σi. This im-
plies that the ratings from different users are assumed uncorrelated. Although
we don’t plan to deal with this effect explicitly in this paper, we would like to
point out that the correlation effect is automatically damped down when us-
ing our iterative refinement. Because we down weight users with weaker rating
capabilities, sets of users with poorer rating capabilities but having correlated
ratings will have their votes downweighted and therefore won’t be able to bias
the result much 1 . For users with excellent rating capabilities but having cor-
related ratings, keeping or removing the redundancy does not produce much
effect on the final result either. The correlation between users, therefore, does
not have a prominent effect. We will thus present the study of the correlation
effect in a separate publication, and in the mean time return to the case of
uncorrelated users.
To be specific, we shall employ the following voting distributions:
PV (xil) =
1√
2σi
e−
√
2|xil−Ql|/σi (6)
PV (xil) =
(f − 1)/2√
Cfσ2i /2

 |xil −Ql|√
Cfσ2i /2
+ 1


−f
(7)
where Cf = (f−2)(f−3) for f > 3. In this case both distributions have finite
second moments given by
∫
PV (xil)[xil − Ql]2dxil = σ2i . We may extend the
exponent f to be in the range 1 < f ≤ 3 at the expense of a divergent second
moment, and set Cf≤3 = 2. The resulting distribution (7), falling outside
the realm of the central limit theorem, will also be considered. Finally, the
distribution widths σi are also randomly drawn from a distribution function
p. The broader the distribution function, i.e. the greater the inhomogeneity in
rating capabilities, the harder it is to have resulting ql’s close to the intrinsic
Ql’s.
As a quantitative measure of the accuracy of any estimation method, we use a
1 This is assuming that the ratings of users are not all biased in the same direction
for every object. If all the ratings are biased in the same direction, then a new
consensus is formed and there is nothing one can do to retrieve the correct attributes
based only on the ratings given.
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Euclidean-like distance between the estimated solution {ql} and the intrinsic
values {Ql}:
∆ =
√√√√ 1
M
M∑
l=1
(ql −Ql)2. (8)
Since in many applications it is required to rank the M objects in order of
decreasing quality, it is useful to compare the estimated ranked list LE with
the intrinsic one LI . A measure I(p) is introduced to examine the ranking
integrity within the top p proportion of the object’s quality list:
I(p) ≡ 1
[pM ]
[pM ]∑
R=1
n(R)
R
, (9)
where [x] indicates the maximum integer that is smaller than or equal to x.
Here n(R) denotes the number of objects, among the top R ones in the esti-
mated ranking list LE , whose intrinsic qualities rank among the top R in the
intrinsic list LI . The higher the quantity I(p), the better the overlap between
the estimated ranking and the intrinsic one. For illustrative purposes, we shall
consider p = 0.5 in this study. It is worth pointing out that the expectation
value of I(p) from random sampling can be calculated (see supplementary
information for the complete proof):
〈I(p)〉0 = [pM ] + 1
2M
M≫1−→ p/2; (10)
In order to have a more precise measure of the variation of ∆ and I(p) around
their respective means, we calculate the “up” variance 〈(∆−〈∆〉)2〉∆>〈∆〉 and
“down” variance 〈(∆− 〈∆〉)2〉∆<〈∆〉 (identically in I(p) case) and report their
square roots as asymmetric error bars in Figs. 1, 3 and 5.
Effect of the number of objects and raters
Both the distance measure ∆ in eq. (8) and the ranking-integrity measure
I(p) in eq. (9) are functions of M and implicitly of N . For simplicity we
will assume M = N and measure both ∆ and I(p = 0.5) for various N and
different stochastic distribution functions PV (x).
As shown in Fig. 1.(a), using the iterative refinement method the difference
between the q’s and the Q’s becomes smaller steadily with increasing N . When
using the exponential distribution (6) for voting, within numerical errors the
downward slope equals −1/2 as expected from the Law of Large Numbers.
6
When the voting distribution function has a power law tail that prevents a
finite second moment, the proposed method still shows steady improvement
with increasing N . In Fig. 1.(a) we also show, as a comparison, the simple
average with equal weights: the difference ∆ is much larger and its convergence
to zero is not guaranteed. Moreover, the precision for a moderately large set
of data is strengthened by the rapid decrease of the error bars.
In Fig. 1.(b) we show how the ranking integrity changes with size. There is
a clear separation between the na¨ıve arithematical average and the iterative
refinement method. The increase of the ranking integrity with N confirms that
the robustness of our method increases steadily with the system size. When
using the naive averages, on the other hand, it seems to change only slightly
or not at all, within the precision of the indicated error bars.
Self-evaluating community
Our method can be easily applied to another context: a self-evaluating com-
munity. Suppose a community of experts tries to find the intrinsic ranking of
its own membership. Each expert has an opinion on every other member in
this community and opinions are uncorrelated. In this case we have N = M
and the asymmetrical matrix element {xij} denotes ith member’s rating on
jth member. Thus, each member has a given attribute we call quality as well
as a given rating capability. With minor modifications, (4) and (5) become
∑
i 6=j
1
V βi
(xij − qj) = 0, j = 1, 2, . . . , N , (11)
∑
j 6=i
(xij − qj)2
Vi
=N, i = 1, 2, . . . , N . (12)
Our iterative approach can be readily used to find the solutions for the q’s
and the V ’s (estimated for Q’s and σ2’s). There are members who are judged
by others as higher quality authorities and some members turn out to excel
at rating fellow members. Still others are good at both.
For the self-evaluating community, the simulation results on ∆ and I(p = 0.5)
largely agree with those presented in Fig. 1. Apparently, one may wishfully
believe that there exist correlations between the qualities of being good experts
and being good raters. For example, in the real world people often assume that
being a good expert automatically implies being a good rater. However, we
should be cautious in this regard: though very likely the two types of quality
are somewhat correlated, we should let the data itself bring out evidence which
may support or undermine such a hypothesis. To demonstrate this possibility,
we have run a simulation where everyone has the same rating capability and
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another where the rating capability 1/σi of user i is directly proportional to
his quality Qi of being a good expert. Although no information about the
correlations between Qi and σi is fed into our iterative refinement method,
the result shown in Fig. 2. – plotting 1/V 1/2 versus q – reflects strongly the
respective underlying correlations.
Individualized biases of the target Ql
One may object to the fact that each rater’s distribution is symmetrical around
the intrinsic attribute. To subject our method to more severe tests, we now
relax this condition: we allow each rater to have an individual distribution
function not only with a specific width, but also an object-dependent individ-
ualized biased center. Thus, xil is drawn around Ql +∆Qil, where the center
drift ∆Qil represents the individual bias.
For testing purposes, the quantity ∆Qil was drawn from a uniform distribu-
tion inside [−5, 5], while the intrinsic qualities Ql are within the range [0, 10].
Despite the fact that ∆Q has a rather large range, the convergence of q to Q is
almost as good as in the unbiased case. There is only a small increase in ∆ and
a negligible decrease in I(p = 0.5). Even in the case of the self-evaluating sys-
tem, the modification does not spoil the underlying characteristics. As shown
in Fig. 2., when the rating capability is directly proportional to the expert
quality, the linear relationship found between 1/V 1/2 and q still holds, except
with a smaller slope.
We may conclude that the proposed method is quite effective in decoding the
hidden attributes in the controlled numerical experiments. However, before
proposing it for real applications we must face another type of challenge:
members may harbor private agendas and may willfully distort information.
So far we have dealt with random, neutral noise, which we shall call the
first kind. The second kind of noise, is unique for intended human actions.
Comparing with the information theory of Shannon for transmitting signals
via a noisy channel [5], which by definition deals with noise of the first kind,
we must be wary that our method should be relatively robust against willful
distortion as well. As people often observe in real life information collection
and evaluation, gaming the system is often hard to detect, and still harder to
stop. We now turn to this case.
Intentional distortion
Consider the context of a mutually evaluating community. Since friendships
and rivalries are as ancient as civilization in any human grouping, we must
expect that some will give a more favorable evaluation for their friends, with
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upward deviations often larger than what their rating capability would war-
rant. Likewise they may rate down their enemies. For this reason we shall
extend the proposed model to include some friendship-enemy pairs among the
members of the community. A simple way to implement this is to pick in turn
every member, sending out a fixed number of friendly links landing randomly
on fellow members, and the same number of enemy links. As a result of this
procedure, any member can receive more or less friendly or hostile links. When
two members are linked by a friendly link, they trade favors by up-rating each
other by a upwards bias. Likewise, two enemies will rate down each other by
a downward bias. To simulate this effect, when a member i votes on his friend
(enemy) j, we increase (decrease) the vote xij by 2σi. As a control parameter
we denote by γ the percentage of friendly and hostile links. For instance, at
γ = 30% each member has 30% out of the total fellow members as friends,
and as many enemies. Thus, the remaining 40% are neutral ones to him.
In Fig. 3. we see that, as the percentage γ increases, i.e. the community be-
comes more and more corrupted and ratings become less and less fair, the
decoding efficiency deteriorates. Specifically, one should note the increase of
∆ and the decrease of I(p = 0.5) as γ increases. However, the overall efficiency
holds remarkably well in the face of the massive information corruption. Even
when the majority of fellow members are either friends or enemies, the solu-
tion q still remains very close to Q. As a comparison, we see that the ranking
integrity from the simple average quickly worsens and comes close to the ex-
pectation value from informationless random sampling.
When a member rates another member far away from the intrinsic attribute,
the mischief costs him somewhat in credibility 1/V 1/2, which is the estimate
of his rating capability 1/σ. If there are a high fraction of friends and enemies,
then all are adversely affected in their rating capabilities; this is best seen from
Fig. 3.(b), which shows how the ranking integrity worsens as the friend/enemy
fraction γ increases.
Stability against worst abuses
It is instructive to examine the maximum ability for a member to willfully
distort information about another. We would like to investigate the effect of
a willful distortion on the final rating of the targeted member as well as on
the cheater’s estimated rating capability, which can also be interpreted as his
credibility within the community. For this purpose, the simplest method is to
consider a fair community, where only one member harbors a hidden agenda
to distort the rating of another member by a very wide margin. Since all
other raters are fair, the impact of this distortion can be calculated, as well
as the repercussion on his own rating capability, judged by the community. If
the cost is high for the cheater compared to the possible impact the cheating
would have, then we may conclude that the method is naturally robust in
constraining cheating behavior; if the cost is low for a similar impact, we
should expect that cheating would run rampant and additional features are
called for to prevent it.
It is practical to represent all the members in two rank lists: one for their
quality judged by the fellow members; another for their rating capability as the
result of their behavior in judging others. This is similar in spirit to the notion
of authority and hub [6], two qualities that are also central in ranking web
pages. Assume one cheater in an otherwise fair community. Because promotion
and demotion have almost identical costs on the cheater’s rating capability, we
need illustrate in detail only one of the two possible ways of cheating. Suppose
the cheater promotes a friend beyond the intrinsic merit by a quantity B. We
wish to know (i) by how much this promotion would move his friend up in
the attribute rank list, and (ii) by how much this cheating would move the
cheater down on the rating capability rank list. We may further inquire what
is the maximum distortion a member can possibly create. This is interesting
since only by knowing the worst case scenario can we learn how robust this
method is.
First we note that there indeed exists an upper bound on the possible cheating.
A member launching a desperate distortion act, not caring about any damage
to his own rating capability, could not favor his fellow indefinitely. Because
the rating from cheater I is weighted by 1/V
β>1/2
I (see the METHOD section)
and VI(B ≫ 1) is related to VI(B = 0) via the relation 2
VI(B ≫ 1)− VI(B = 0) = B
2
N
[1 +O(1/B)],
the overall contribution from cheater I on his pal J that he is trying to promote
behaves like
≈ xIJ +B
[σ2I (B = 0) +
B2
N
]β
for large B, and it becomes vanishingly small when β > 1/2. This indicates
that when rating an object way out of proportion, the net effect is as if the
distorted vote never existed and our desperate cheater may not want to inflict
such an egregious distortion lest his credibility drops to the bottom of the
list. Such a desperate act in reality inflicts the maximal damage to his own
credibility while achieving little desired result. Therefore, a rational cheater
may then take a more calculated approach to produce a maximal distortion.
A highly credible member can generate a larger distortion than an average
member, should he choose to do so; a member on the bottom of the rating
2 This relation stands valid even when B ≈ 1 except that then there are other
correction terms of comparable order. A detailed study of this effect will be presented
in a forthcoming publication.
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capability rank list has, however, weaker impact on promoting or demoting
other members.
From the system point of view, we do not have to suffer from the maximal
distortion. It is easy to detect such attempts and the cheater’s rating can be
simply ignored and, at our discretion, the cheater’s rating capability can be
restored since his contribution evaluating other neutral members is a valuable
service we want to keep. We call this the “S” strategy. The implementation of
the “S” strategy is flexible, we can either choose to inflict a punitive penalty
or simply detect cheating and ignore it. Although it should depend on how
reliably we can detect cheating, we currently implement the “S” strategy in
two steps: if the rating from voter i to object l is more than two
√
Vi away from
ql, we down weight the rating xil by an additional factor (2
√
Vi/|xil − ql|)1/2
and we totally discard the weight whenever |xil − ql| > 3
√
Vi.
A simulation of 400 experts in a self-evaluating community is performed to
test the effect of intentional distortions. In this simulation, we assume that
each rater’s rating capability is directly proportional to his intrinsic quality.
Forty realizations of different rating matrices are evaluated with the iterative
refinement approach and the rank changes due to cheating for each rating
matrix are averaged. We note that, as summarized in Fig. 4.(a), when the
cheater’s intrinsic rating capability ranks high, he can promote others more
than a cheater with mediocre rating capability. The cheater will have to pay
a price of moving his rank down on the rating capability list by about 100 to
achieve the maximum distortion of about 10− 15. However, once we turn on
the “S” strategy, appreciable distortion can no longer be achieved, as demon-
strated in the bottom two curves of Fig. 4.(a). Therefore, it is possible to
maintain a high degree of fairness and discourage cheating when this new
method is employed in real society. With more information shared and less
cheating allowed, our society can grow into a happier and healthier whole.
In real life the rating capability and one’s intrinsic quality might not be al-
ways correlated, as plausibly assumed in our simulation. However, without any
presumption, working with real data may well reveal any correlation, since
the method we propose does not exclude any specific one. We may propose a
combined quality parameter to represent a member’s overall capability, q/
√
V .
Any member, found to rank high on this new combined rank list, will be both
judged highly by fellow members and behave well in judging others. The new
rank list would also serve as a deterrent to cheating: any willful distortion
attempt would cost a cheater somewhat in overall quality. The cost-benefit
analysis now becomes even simpler: cheating may move up (down) a friend’s
(enemy’s) rating, but the cheater’s own overall rating slips. In the previously
mentioned simulation, we also document the change of this unified rank for
both the cheater and the benefited object. In Fig. 4.(b) it appears again that
cheating does not pay. Note that the bump in the tail of RV = 10, RO = 100,
with strategy “S” turned on, is not an indication of the malfunction of our
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method. In fact, there the advance of the object’s unified rank is due to the
fact that the cheater’s unified rank has dropped below that of the object’s.
This nice feature again discourages severe cheating!
Finally, one may also wish to test the method against the possibility of ignorant
voters. To model this, we assume there is only a certain proportion C of the
raters voting according to distribution (6), while the rest of the raters are
voting randomly between ǫ and 10 + ǫ. Figure 5. documents the test using a
population of 400 voters in a self-evaluating community. Our method provides
appreciable improvement over the simple average
4 Outlook and Concluding Summary
We have proposed an iterative refinement method to estimate the hidden
intrinsic qualities of a set of objects that have been evaluated by a group of
raters. The method consists of aggregating these evaluations in a weighted
sum, with the aim to give more weight to expert raters. Weights and qualities
are estimated iteratively from the same data set. Extensive simulation results
show that the proposed method is able to recover the hidden attributes with
remarkably good precision, even when the conditions of the Law of Large
Numbers are not fulfilled. In particular, it overwhelms the performance of the
naive simple average in most circumstances.
The proposed method is intended to be mainly applied to virtual communities
of all kinds, where people are allowed to express their opinions on a particular
subject –which can be a material object, a person or even another opinion. In
addition to the objects’ intrinsic values, the method allows detection of the
rating capabilities of the users. This provides valuable information, since it
defines reputations [7] without the need of any other feedback. It may consti-
tute a strong incentive for users to rate accurately the desired object and a
strong deterrent against cheating.
In fact the proposed method is robust against gaming. It remains effective in
decoding the hidden attributes in the face of two types of noise: random and
intentional. Although we fully anticipate this approach to be effective when
working on real data where the intrinsic values {Ql} are not known at all, we
are in the process of making more critical assessments by gathering data from
existing web sites and by even designing special purpose web sites to acquire
custom data. With more information shared and less cheating allowed, we hope
our method, once implemented, can help our society to grow into a happier
and healthier whole.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we will derive the formula shown in eq. (10). Consider we
have M objects, labeled by O1, O2, . . . , OM , and we randomly put them
into an ordered array of size M . Apparently, there are M ! ways to do so.
The question is then to obtain the probabilities P (k|ℓ) for k objects out of
O1, O2, . . . , Oℓ to be in the top ℓ entries of the array.
When k = ℓ we only have ℓ! ways to order these ℓ objects and (M − ℓ)! ways
to arrange the rest. Therefore, when k = ℓ, we have P (ℓ|ℓ) = (M − ℓ)!ℓ!/M !.
When k < ℓ, we have to put (ℓ − k) objects in the lower M − ℓ bins and k
objects in the top ℓ bins. There are (M−ℓ)!/(M−2ℓ+k)! ways for the former
and ℓ!/(ℓ−k)! ways for the latter. Further, there are ℓ!
k!(ℓ−k)! ≡ Cℓk = Cℓℓ−k ways
to choose which k objects to put in the top ℓ bins. Consequently, we have
P (k|ℓ)= (M − ℓ)!
M !
ℓ!
(ℓ− k)!C
ℓ
k
(M − ℓ)!
(M − 2ℓ+ k)!
=
1
CMℓ
CℓkC
M−ℓ
ℓ−k . (13)
As a simple check, we can verify that
∑ℓ
k=0 P (k|ℓ) = 1 because∑ℓ
k=0C
ℓ
kC
M−ℓ
ℓ−k = C
M
ℓ which can be easily proved by evaluating the coefficient
of xℓ in the two equivalent expressions (1 + x)M and (1 + x)M−ℓ × (1 + x)ℓ.
It is instructive to compute the expectation value of k/ℓ for a given ℓ
〈
k
ℓ
〉
=
ℓ∑
k=0
k
ℓ
CℓkC
M−ℓ
ℓ−k =
ℓ∑
k=1
Cℓ−1k−1C
(M−1)−(ℓ−1)
(ℓ−1)−(k−1)
=
ℓ−1∑
k′=0
Cℓ−1k′ C
(M−1)−(ℓ−1)
k′−(ℓ−1) = C
M−1
ℓ−1
Now the quantity of interest I(p), averaged under a random ensemble, can be
13
expressed as
〈I(p)〉0 = 1
[pM ]
[pM ]∑
ℓ=1
CM−1ℓ−1
CMℓ
=
1
[pM ]
[pM ]∑
ℓ=1
ℓ
M
=
[pM ] + 1
2M
(14)
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Figure 1.. Figures (a) and (b) show, respectively, the dependence of ∆, from eq. (8),
and of I(p = 0.5), from eq. (9), on the system size N . The intrinsic quality of each
object is randomly uniformly drawn from the interval (0, 10). A small finite constant
ǫ = 0.001 is introduced so that the judging width is always bounded by const/ǫ to
avoid the potential artifact of infinite width. For the power-law case (eq. (7)), we
picked f = 2.5, so that the second moment of V diverges, to test the robustness
of our method. Indeed, the deviations ∆ still decrease steadily with size, although
not as fast as for the exponential voting distribution (eq. (6)), while the ranking
integrity grows. The solid (dashed) line passing through the exponential (power-law)
voting distribution in graph (a) has slope −0.50± 0.01 (−0.42± 0.01). The dashed
line in graph (b) is the result for the random case (eq. (10)). Error bars have been
estimated from the standard deviation of one hundred realizations of different initial
configurations.
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Figure 2.. Experts’ estimated rating capability versus estimated quality. Using
N = 400, data is taken from the outcome of a typical single run with, respec-
tively, σi = const. (circles), σi = const./Qi with a random center-drift uniformly
distributed between [−5, 5] (x signs) and without drift (diamonds).
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Figure 3.. The effect of intentional distortion on ∆. The abscissa records γ, the ratio
of friends and enemies to the population in a community; the ordinate documents
the distance ∆ (a) and the rank integrity I(p = 0.5) (b). Using N = 400, the
data are obtained from the outcome of one hundred simulation runs. The standard
deviations from the mean value are shown as a vertical bar around the average
value.
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Figure 4.. The effect of extreme intentional distortion on the object’s rank (a) and on
the object’s unified rank(b). RV represents the cheater’s rank in the intrinsic rating
capability list, while RO represents the benefited object’s rank in the intrinsic quality
list. By increasing the amount of intentional distortion B, the 1/
√
V rank of the
cheater worsens while the q rank of the benefited object also covaries. When the “S”
strategy is turned on, we see that the cheater has very little impact in distortion,
despite how willing he is to sacrifice himself. See the text for the explanation of the
final bump in the red curve of figure (b).
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Figure 5.. The effect of ignorance. C represents the proportion of conscious raters
who vote according to the exponential distribution (6). (a) Ranking integrity
I(p = 0.5) against C. (b) ∆ against C. We see that I(p = 0.5) (resp. ∆) increases
(decreases) rapidly, and becomes much bigger (smaller) than the simple average,
when C > 0.4. σ’s of conscious voters are drawn from an exponential distribution
with mean 1.
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